Author: Isidor Zeuner 2014-08-23 11:53:21
Published on: 2014-08-23T11:53:21+00:00
Isidor proposes a PoW-based approach to prevent DoS attacks on Tor exit nodes for Bitcoin. He responds to Mike's concern that requiring complicated work from all clients is not the best solution and suggests that only those using an address that has been misbehaving should be required to do the PoW. Isidor argues that this approach would improve the situation as it would make it harder for attackers to keep up their attacks. Mike suggests that the correct way to solve DoS is by having work prioritization and queueing mechanisms and finding ways to distinguish "good" clients from "bad" ones, but acknowledges that preserving privacy while doing so is challenging. Finally, Isidor proposes having both options available - allowing those who can solve the anti-DoS PoW to connect even if slower, while those who wish to run a weak client can choose to sacrifice privacy for connectivity and keep a cookie for connecting.
Updated on: 2023-06-09T02:26:09.494991+00:00