Author: Christian Decker 2011-08-25 21:30:56
Published on: 2011-08-25T21:30:56+00:00
In an email exchange, Christian Decker suggested a possible solution to the problem of compromised machines endangering the security of a secret key. He proposed combining the results of smaller encryptions/signatures using Lagrange interpolation, without ever sharing the secret key share itself. While unsure if this would be possible with ECDSA, it could allow several independent servers to share a secret key and sign transactions with it, while eliminating the risk that m-1 compromised machines could endanger the entire balance. Gregory Maxwell responded that while this RSA-like scheme works for ECC, it does not solve the issue of malware on individual machines since the composite key signer needs simultaneous access to all key-parts.
Updated on: 2023-05-26T20:30:51.060648+00:00