RBF Pinning with Counterparties and Competing Interest



Summary:

The context is a conversation about a proposal made by Matt regarding the hashlock branch. It is mentioned that miners will accept Matt's proposal, which involves B and C agreeing to show the preimage of some hash H. Then, they agree that B provides a signature spending the hashlock branch to a transaction with normal payment to C and hook output to B and C. The proposal also mentions how B can avoid maintaining a mempool by broadcasting its timelock transaction and trying to CPFP the hashlock transaction. The conversation then moves on to whether low-fee transactions hooked by C will still be confirmed by miners. The response confirms that once the transaction makes it into the mempool, it can be CPFP'd and all the regular sub-package CPFP calculation will pick it up as long as it does not spend any other unconfirmed inputs.


Updated on: 2023-05-20T21:59:04.557123+00:00