Author: s7r 2015-04-18 14:49:53
Published on: 2015-04-18T14:49:53+00:00
In an email exchange, Pieter Wuille warns that a system's security cannot fully rely on txids being non-malleable. An attacker may have financial gain from malleation, and creating a system that depends on non-malleability for its security could be vulnerable. In theory, anyone can alter the txid without invalidating it, without mining power and without access to the sender's private keys. After BIP62, senders will optionally be able to protect others from malleating and are always able to re-sign themselves. An example is given of an insurance transaction which could be invalidated if the input was modified. If this happens, a new transaction needs to be signed with the altered (new) txid, for the system to work.
Updated on: 2023-06-09T19:08:56.518658+00:00