Author: Mark Friedenbach 2014-04-28 17:29:46
Published on: 2014-04-28T17:29:46+00:00
In an email conversation between Sergio Lerner and a recipient on April 28th, 2014, the topic of periodic connection to an honest node during a potential attack is discussed. Lerner states that his use case assumes the loss of this connection during an attack, which he believes should be the working assumption. However, the recipient believes that SPV proofs have many broader applications, such as 2-way pegs, which utilize proof-of-work to reach consensus over the most-work side-chain header. The recipient argues that while an honest peer is necessary to learn about the best chain, trust in that peer is not required because a non-51% attack against the user is probabilistically detectable with existing tools. Although the recipient acknowledges that SmartSPV, the protocol described by Lerner, may be useful, they state that it is a higher-level protocol that uses block headers to determine which chain to trust. The recipient suggests that back-link commitments and compact SPV proofs can accomplish the same thing with fewer messages, less bandwidth, and equal security. The two proposals are not in conflict with each other.
Updated on: 2023-06-08T21:48:35.029434+00:00