Published on: 2013-04-08T12:32:30+00:00
BTC Guild, a prominent Bitcoin mining pool, has proposed a plan to mitigate the risk of malicious attacks on the network. The plan was developed in response to concerns raised by Bitcoin users regarding BTC Guild's significant share of the network, which currently stands at over 40%. If BTC Guild's share surpasses certain thresholds, the proposed measures will be implemented. For instance, if BTC Guild's share reaches 45% or higher, getwork based pools will be removed within 24 hours. Moreover, PPS fees will be raised from 5% to 7%, and PPLNS fees will be increased from 3% to 4% if the share exceeds 40% again. Nevertheless, these fees will be reduced once the pool drops below 40% for more than 72 hours. To ensure the successful execution of the plan, users are expected to actively participate by offering their comments and inquiries on the related forum thread.In an email exchange from April 5th, 2013, Melvin Carvalho discussed the risks associated with double spending in blockchain technology. He specifically raised concerns about the difficulty of rectifying chain vandalism caused by deliberately triggering bugs or inserting illegal data into the chain. This conversation emphasized the importance of addressing vulnerabilities in the underlying technology and increasing the cost for potential attackers engaging in malicious activities.In another email exchange, Mike Hearn argued that attacking Bitcoin's network would ultimately be counterproductive due to the permanent record it would leave behind and the likelihood of miners abandoning the pool responsible for the attack. However, Robert expressed concerns about detecting such attacks, highlighting the limited ability to identify the pool responsible based solely on the source IP disseminating the new block. Additionally, even if end miners discovered the double-spending blocks, they would not necessarily attribute them to the pool operator. Robert suggested that the pool owner could avoid reputational damage by channeling the double-spend blocks through previously unknown IPs repeatedly.In a separate conversation, Melvin Carvalho expressed concerns about a mining pool reaching a 46% share and the potential for a 51% attack. Mike Hearn responded by noting that double-spending against confirmed transactions could occur before reaching the 51% threshold. He also mentioned other risks, such as vandalizing the blockchain or manipulating the price downwards. Hearn proposed alternative mining protocols that enable pooling without allowing the pool operator to select which transactions go into the block. Carvalho previously suggested that a decentralized pool would prevent a 51% attack, but it was pointed out that the pool owner still has control over block composition. The discussion explored the challenges of coordinating a 51% attack through random non-colliding nonces and the possibility of creating one random number and incrementing from there. As Bitcoin's market cap grows, the incentives to manipulate the market are expected to increase. The community acknowledged the limitations of p2pool in dealing with FPGA/ASIC hardware but emphasized that the market would ultimately determine the preferred algorithm, while the community could review and prioritize different mining protocols based on their associated risks.A message thread from April 5th, 2013, touched on the growth and challenges faced by p2pool. Mike Hearn expressed his belief that p2pool had not been growing for a considerable time and struggled with FPGA/ASIC hardware. However, another participant clarified that p2pool worked well with FPGAs and was utilized by one of the largest FPGA farms. The issue lay with BFL FPGA miners and Avalon's latency. The stability of p2pool was affected when ASICminer started mining on BTC Guild and the first Avalons were shipped, leading to a significant network increase. The discussion concluded with a reminder to support individuals working on infrastructure and ensure they have the necessary resources to continue providing free services. It was highlighted that assumptions about these contributors being wealthy Bitcoin veterans were often incorrect.In an email to the Bitcoin development mailing list, Melvin Carvalho expressed concerns about a mining pool reaching 46%, although he acknowledged that the estimates on blockchain.info might not be entirely accurate. The conversation shifted towards the risk of a 51% attack, with Carvalho suggesting that a decentralized pool would prevent such an attack. However, it was highlighted that none of the pools listed on blockchain.info were genuinely decentralized and that pool owners had control over block composition. The primary threat did not lie in pool owners acting maliciously but rather in their systems being hacked or subjected to coercion. Coordinating a 51% attack by the owner might be nearly impossible due to random non-colliding nonces, but miners' propensity for entrusting their hash power to questionable parties without considering the risks was emphasized. It was crucial to understand the nature of the threat, as someone with a significant amount of hash power could replace confirmed blocks with an alternative chain containing different transactions, enabling them to reclaim previously irreversible funds.
Updated on: 2023-08-01T04:36:59.133255+00:00